by
Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh and Dikgaj
Subhas Chandra Bose had witnessed the rise of Islamist separatism in India in the 1930s leading to explicit demands for Pakistan by Muslim League in 1940. He was determined to thwart partition of India in addition to winning freedom from British colonialism. While in Europe between 1941-1943 these goals determined his approach to Muslims. Despite his initial vastly weaker position on arrival relative to the well connected Islamist communal networks in Europe, with the Congress party centre having managed to force him out, and the absence of matching Hindu counter mobilisation and presence in Europe to neutralise Islamist lobbying, he single-handedly turned around thinking or stalled moves in Axis powers that earlier heavily leaned in favour of Islamists. His typically pragmatic approach navigating his otherwise stubborn idealism made him prioritise the interests of Indian nationalist objectives over and above that of community specific interests. He fought to isolate Muslims he saw as a threat to India’s unity and sovereignty and remove them from influence over his European hosts, but simultaneously embraced those Indian Muslims he saw as potentially agreeable to India’s freedom from British imperialism, and maintained socially cordial relationships with Muslims from outside India whom he didn’t see as immediate threat for India’s unity and freedom.
Separatism was growing among the Muslims of undivided India in the 1930s. Separatist demands surfaced during the first Round Table Conference between India and England in 1930. Subsequently, on 28 January 1933 Chowdhury Rehmat Ali published a pamphlet known as the Pakistan Declaration which demanded that five Northern units of India namely Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, form a separate nation outside India. This document was circulated among the Indian and Pakistani delegates of the Third Round Table Conference in London in 1933. Then at the Lahore Session of All India Muslim League held from 22nd to 24th March 1940, the demand for separation of the Muslim majority states in the North-Western and Eastern flank of India was formally presented. Muhammad Ali Jinnah led the fight for formation of Pakistan from around the time of this session. Subhas Chandra Bose was irreconcilably opposed to partition of India into two or more parts. He has written in his political history of India, “Indian Struggle’’, first published in 1935, and subsequently augmented during 1941-1943 in Germany : “Pakistan is, of course, a fantastic plan and an unpractical proposition – for more reasons than one. India is geographically, historical, culturally, politically and economically an indivisible unit. Secondly, in most parts of India, Hindus and Muslims are so mixed up that it is not possible to separate them. Thirdly, if Muslim states were forcibly set up, new minority problems would be created in these states which would present new difficulties. Fourthly, unless Hindus and Muslims join hands and fight the British, they cannot liberate themselves and their unity is possible only on the basis of a free and undivided India. An independent Pakistan is an impossibility and Pakistan, therefore, means in practice, dividing India in order to ensure British domination for all. It is noteworthy that in his latest utterances, Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, and a champion of Pakistan, has acknowledged that the creation and maintenance of Pakistan is possible only with the help of the British ‘’ p. 359, [1]. Note how prophetic he was about minority problems cropping up in Pakistan should it be created: in less than 25 years after its creation, Bangladesh separated from Pakistan on this linguistic basis. In “Indian Struggle’’ Bose had pejoratively referred to the separatist Muslims as “anti-Nationalists’’: “ the anti-Nationalist Moslems who were present at the (first) Round Table Conference declared that they would agree to responsible Government with Federation and Safeguards, only if the communal question was decided to their satisfaction’’ p. 218, [1]. This part appears to have been written in the first version of Indian Struggle which was written shortly after the third round table conference. In April 1931, prior to the Second Round Table Conference, he had even counselled Gandhi to ignore these anti-nationalists and rejected even independence on the basis of separate electorates as it went against the core of nationalist principles: “the Mahatma held a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi in April (1931). I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him the same evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a depressed mood, because they had presented him with the fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as Jinnah’s fourteen points) and he felt that an agreement would not be possible on that basis. Thereupon I remarked that the Congress should only care for an agreement between Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and the agreed solution should be presented before the [Second] Round Table Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the absence of the third party the different communities would live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate electorates are against the fundamental principles of Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion, not worth having’’ pp. 237-238, [1].
In his book on Subhas Bose and his brother Sarat Bose, the American historian Leonard Gordon has written that the Pakistan movementwas an “ anathema to Bose’’ p. 450, [5]. Mihir Bose, a British-Indian journalist, has written that Subhas Chandra Bose had feared the growing Muslim separatist tendency ever since his last meeting with Jinnah in India in June 1940p. 303, [8]. Mihir Bose had even posited that Subhas had aligned with the Axis powers to stop the partition of India: “He [Subhas] wasconvinced thatJinnah was preparing to partition the country, and – crucially – he believed thatat least one important Indian leadershould be present at the peace negotiations at the end of the War; he predicted that the vanquished (Britain) would bargain with the victor (Germany), butnot totally surrender’’ p. 276, [8].
Subhas Chandra Bose’s broadcasts on Muslims and his interactions with Indian Muslims in Germany and Italy between 1941 and 1943 was guided by his rejection of Muslim separatism in India. We first describe his interactions with Indian Muslims (Section A). We subsequently describe his broadcasts on Muslim separatism in particular and Indian Muslims in general (Section B). In both we notice that his approach was independent of that of Axis stand or guidance on Indian Muslims and in many instances he influenced their stands. We finally describe his stands on non-Indian Muslims (Section C).
Section A: Bose’s interactions with Indian Muslims in Nazi Germany
Among the Indian Muslims in Germany, Subhas Bose embraced the nationalists and shunned and even marginalized the separatists. We first consider how he treated the former set. Two Muslims from South India were his close confidantes. Among them, Abid Hasan from Hyderabad, had studied engineering at Berlin Technical College, and Dr. A. Q. Faroqi, had trained in both engineering and medicine. Faroqi served as Bose’s personal physician. Both were frequent visitors at his home in Berlin pp. 447, 452, [5]. Another young Muslim from Hyderabad called Sultan who wrote and spoke excellent Urdu ran the Azad Muslim Radio from Bose’s Free India Center and made a success of it p. 211, [4].
Bose however bore reservations against the Indian Muslims who sought to impose an Islamist rule which considered India as part of the Muslim world. This led to conflicts between Bose and the India offices of Germany and Italy. The Orient Department of Germany tended to link India with the First World War conception of the “Fertile Crescent” of the Middle East countries. In fact, one of this department, a Mr. Quelling, ultimately turned hostile and tried to create a Pakistan lobby p. 279, [3]. The Italian India office concentrated heavily on the Muslims of Indian subcontinent. This made it difficult for them to work with Bose p. 81, [6].
Muhammad Iqbal Shedai, an Indian Muslim from Sialkot in Punjab, born in either 1892 or 1898 was in Italy during the Second World War. Shedai was involved in communist activities in his youth, had spent some time with M. N. Roy in Moscow. He was expelled from France in 1938. Then Mussolini became his patron. Mussolini was the self-proclaimed protector of all followers of Islam p. 303, [8]. With the assistance of the Italian Foreign Office, he used to broadcast to India over a Radio channel he called “Radio Himalaya’’. He had limited recognition beyond a small circle of Indians and Europeans, but he had a good connection to the Italian Government and did not want to be a subordinate to Bose p. 450, [5]. Bose and Shedai shared a mutual distrust owing to the opposing ideologies each subscribed to. Leonard Gordon has written, “Shedai came to support the Pakistan movement which was anathema to Bose. The former looked at India as closely connected to the Middle East and the Islamic world, whereas for Bose it was a world unto itself.’’ p. 450, [5]. Mihir Bose has written, “Bose saw in Shedai the personification of the growing Muslim separatist tendency that he had feared ever since his last meeting with Jinnah in India. Shedai’s Azad Hindustan organization consisted entirely of Muslims, including a relative of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and a former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, close to ex-king Amanullah. Himalay Radio, which now began broadcasting from Rome (pretending to broadcast from India), vituperatively denounced Gandhi and Nehru and increasingly argued a separatist ‘Pakistan’ line ’’ pp. 303-304, [8]. For Shedai, Labh Singh and Ajit Singh (Bhagat Singh’s uncle), Bose was a `dubious Congress politician’ p. 53, [7]. Shedai had privately warned the Germans that Bose was recruiting a nest of Communists to Berlin p. 450, [5]. On 22 May, 1941, Shedai wrote in a letter, “Mr. Bose depends for his revolutionary work on my party – i.e., the Kirti Kisan Party […] his work […] is nothing but imaginary […] all parties in India are against Mr. Bose and especially the All India National Congress which expelled him from its ranks […] It is a pity that none has faith in him [… and] most […] Bengalis are against him […] As far as I can tell, he has not been able to persuade the Germans to accept his programme, if he has any’’ p. 54, [7].
In August 1941 Bose had lunch with Shedai and Werth and Pierre Laval, the Vichy French Prime Minister at Tour d’ Argent of Paris p. 304, [8]. During the second half of 1941, Shedai visited Berlin twice to meet Bose and negotiate with German Foreign Office representatives about the formation of an Indian Legion and the propaganda operation. The Germans would have preferred a combined operation. Shedai and Bose were becoming even more hostile by that time. One of Bose’s recruits on the military side has written that Bose was “not a man to make a patch up.’’ p. 456, [5]. One of the visits was in September, 1941. During the visit Shedai criticized much of the German work and blamed the “dictatorial ambitions” of “His Excellency Mazzotta”. Shedai missed no opportunity to attack Bose, including on the treatment of the Indian prisoners of war in the training camp near Dresden p. 304, [8]. Basically, Indian PoWs in Stalag IV D/Z in Annaburg were being given poor rations, so Shedai chose to blame Bose for their miseries p. 60, [7].
Adam von Trott zu Solz was a senior official of the foreign ministry who was placed in the actual charge of the liaison office with India. In September, 1941, Trott had suggested to Shedai that he become the head of the Free India Centre and the Prisoners of War, going as far as to suggest reducing Bose to a mere figurehead. However, Trott was not supported by his own superiors and Shedai made unreasonable conditions for his acceptance, so it came to nothing p. 60, [7].
Bose and Trott tried to persuade him to come and work in Berlin. For that Shedai insisted on formation of a joint Italo-German-Indian committee. Bose dismissed the idea, and Shedai could not even present it to the Germans. Shedai then stayed put in Rome p. 304, [8]. On 4 October 1941, the Italian Foreign Ministry informed the German embassy that it had allocated a floor of a Foreign Ministry building in Rome to set up ‘Center India’ headed by Shedai. p. 303, [8].
On December 19, 1941, the Wehrmacht approved training the prisoners of war who would join the Indian Legion, which would be Bose’s military force p. 456, [5]. During the recruitment drive, Shedai also complained about Bose to German and Italian Foreign ministries: “He himself is quite unfit (for) any such work (recruiting among the prisoners of war). Firstly he is not from the province of these soldiers. He does not understand them. Their mentality is quite different from that of his. Some men who are working with the Foreign Office are not revolutionaries and do not know how to deal with revolutionary problems. Mr Mazzotta, too, belongs to the same category. Secondly Mr Mazzotta belongs to a class which has nothing in common with the soldiers. He cannot understand their needs because he is not one of them” p. 458, [5].
In February 1942 Shedai tried to get the Japanese interested in his ideas, but the Japanese did not respond p. 316, [8]. In May 1942 he invited Bose to the opening ceremony of Amici dell’ India, Friends of India and a magazine called Italia e India. Bose went to Rome but did not attend the ceremony. He however met Shedai and subsequently Mussolini, the supreme leader of Italy, Ciano, the foreign minister of Italy, Prunas, the secretary of state, his old friend Professor Tucci, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amanullah (ex-king of Afghanistan) and Rashid Ali al-Gilani p. 304, [8].
Shedai tried to form his own Indian Legion in Italy. It dissolved in a mutiny in late 1942 p. 125, [6]. The soldiers refused to fight the British in North Africa p. 139, [7]. Shedai and Bose could never come to a rapprochement p. 450, [5]. Finally, Bose told the Italians that Shedai was supporting Muslim League and this was enough to scuttle his power with the Italians p. 124, [7].
Section B: Bose’s broadcasts on Indian Muslims from Nazi Germany
As early as December, 1941, the Germans and Japanese regarded Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a dangerous man, albeit a British stooge, as attacking him could cause problems with Muslim public opinion. Romain Hayes, a historian who has examined the stay of Subhas Bose in Nazi Germany, notes in his book that, “ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the separatist Muslim League, was also perceived as a serious threat. The League was seen as `an additional factor in the artificial protraction of the disunity of India by the British.’’ p. 74, [7]. On 8, 9 December 1941, Bose sat on the German side and Shedai on the Italian side in a conference organized between Germany, Italy and Japan to coordinate policy on India pp. 73-74, [7]. It was agreed upon there that Bose would not criticize Muslim League. Still in his broadcast on 25 March, 1942, Bose went on a rampage against the Muslim League, denouncing it as a tool of British imperialism, and dismissing claims that it represented Muslims. He rejected any attempt to portray it as the Muslim equivalent of the Congress. He said: “Since the beginning of this century, the British Government has been using another organization as a counterblast to the Congress in order to reject its demands. She has been using the Muslim League for this purpose, because that party is regarded as pro-British in its outlook. In fact, British propaganda has tried to create the impression that the Muslim League is almost as influential a body as Congress, and that it represents the majority of India’s Muslims. This, however, is far from the truth. In reality there are several influential and important Muslim organizations which are thoroughly nationalist. Moreover out of the 11 provinces in British India out of which only 4 have a majority of Muslims, only one, the Punjab, has a Cabinet which may be regarded as a Muslim League Cabinet. But even the Punjab Premier is strongly opposed to the main programme of the Muslim League, namely the division of India. Consequently, it seems that the Muslim League only commands a majority in a single province of India. But even then it is said that the majority of the Muslims will not stand for Indian independence ‘’ pp. 82-83, [2], pp. 95-96, [7].
In general, Germany claimed to have powerful Islamic support stretching from the Grand Mufti of Palestine and Rashid Ali of Iraq to the pro-Amanullah elements in Afghanistan and the Faqir of Ipi and the Khaksars in India (as mentioned in an Indian Political Intelligence note submitted in the second half of 1940) p. 253, [8]. Accordingly, the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was worried about Muslim separatism, but Bose assured him that it was a British ploy and dismissed the Muslim League as a `backward looking clique’ and `plutocratic and self interests’. He also said partition was a British manoeuvre akin to the one in Ireland. He also promised Ribbentrop that Muslims would have absolute and complete cultural freedom and social and economic equality p. 138, [7]. This promise was consistent with Bose’s article of faith in which he envisioned undivided India as a genuinely secular state in which there would be no discrimination on the basis of religion and religion would be treated as a private matter.
In his writings and speeches during his stay in Germany, Bose dismissed Muslim separatism as an artificial British construct and attributed its promotion to British propaganda. He rejected the notion that Muslims could not be assimilated into the new state of India, claiming that the notion were just a British creation, like the situation in Ireland or the Jewish problem of Palestine. He appealed to Muslim organizations and leaders to shun British imperialism as the British empire was soon to end.
- On 25 March, 1942, while opposing the Cripps Mission, he said in a broadcast, “Britain has, in other parts of her Empire, for instance in Ireland and Palestine, used the religious issue in order to divide the people. She has been utilizing in India for that same purpose not only this issue but other imperial weapons like the Indian princes, Depressed Classes, etc.’’ p. 81, [2].
- In August 1942, he wrote in an article in “Wille and Macht’’ which was published in German and reprinted in Azad Hind, “British propaganda has deliberately created the impression that the Indian Mohammedans are against the Independence movement. But this is altogether false. The fact is that in the nationalist movement, there is a large percentage of Mohammedans. The President of the Indian National Congress today is Azad – a Mohammedan. The vast majority of the Indian Mohammedans are anti-British and want to see India free. There is no doubt pro-British parties among both Mohammedans and Hindus are organized as religious parties. But they should not be regarded as representing the people. The great revolution of 1857 was a grand example of national unity. The war was fought under the flag of Bahadur Shah, a Mohammedan, and all sections of the people joined in it. Since then Indian Mohammedans have continued to work for national freedom. Indian Mohammedans are as much children of the soil as the rest of the Indian population and their interests are identical. The Mohammedan (Muslim) problem in India today is an artificial creation of the British similar to the Ulster problem in Ireland and the Jewish problem in Palestine. It will disappear when British rule is swept away ‘’ pp. 152-153, [2].
- On 31 August 1942, he spoke in his broadcast, “I would request Mr Jinnah, Mr Savarkar and all those leaders who still think of a compromise with the British to realize once for all that in the world of tomorrow there will be no British Empire. All these individuals, groups or parties who now participate in the fight for freedom will have an honored place in the India of tomorrow. The supporters of British Imperialism will naturally become nonentities in a free India. In this connection I will appeal earnestly to all parties and groups to consider this and to think in terms of nationalism and anti-imperialism, and to come forward and join the epic struggle that is going on now. I appeal to the progressive elements of the Muslim League, with some of whom I have had the privilege of cooperating in the work of the Calcutta Corporation in 1940. I appeal to the brave ‘Majlis-I-Ahrar’, the nationalist Muslim Party of India, that started the Civil Disobedience campaign in 1939 against Britain’s war effort before any other party did so. I appeal to the ‘Jamiat-ul-Ulema’, the old representative organization of the Ulemas or the Muslim divines of India, led by that distinguished patriot and leader Mufti Khifayat Ullah. I appeal to the Azad (Independent) Muslim League, another important organization of the nationalist Muslims of India. I appeal to the ‘Akali Dal’, the leading nationalist Sikh party of India. And last but not least I appeal to the ‘Praja Party’ of Bengal, which commands the confidence of that province, and is led by well-known patriots. I have no doubt that if all these organizations join in this struggle the day of India’s liberation will be drawn nearer” p. 144, [2].
- On 15 October 1942, he spoke in his broadcast: “ British plans for post-war India have been made, and if British politicians were to have their own way, they would split up India into four or five states under a strong imperialist Government which would exploit the country more intensively than hitherto, in order to make up for their losses in this war. The Union Jack would then fly not only over the capital of India as at present, but over the capitals of ‘Hindustan’, ‘Pakistan’, ‘Rajasthan’, ‘Khalistan’ and ‘Pathanistan’. And the Indian people would be given a British guarantee of permanent enslavement. Let Mr. M. A. Jinnah and his Muslim League ponder over this” p. 165, [2].
- On 26 January, 1943, he said in his Independence Day address in Berlin: “Along with disarmament [during 1857 Mutiny], the newly established British Government, now controlled directly from London, commenced its policy of ‘divide and rule’. This policy of ‘divide and rule’ has been the fundamental basis of British rule from 1858 till today. For nearly 40 years the policy was to keep India divided by keeping three-fourths of the people directly under British control and the remaining one-fourth under the Indian Princes. Simultaneously, the British Government showed a great deal of partiality for the big landlords in British India. By the beginning of the present century, the British realised, however, that they could no longer dominate India by simply playing the Princes and the big landlords against the people. Then they discovered the Muslim problem in the year 1906, when Lord Minto was Viceroy. Prior to this there was no such problem in India. In the great revolution of 1857, Hindus and Muslims had fought side by side against the British and it was under the flag of Bahadur Shah, a Muslim, that India’s first war of Independence had been fought’’ p. 186, [2]. He continued, “During the last World War, when the British found that further political concessions would have to be made to the Indian people, they realised that it was not enough to try and divide the Muslims from the rest of the population and they then set about trying to divide the Hindus themselves. In this way they discovered the caste problem in 1918, and suddenly became the champions and the liberators of the so-called ‘Depressed Classes’. Till the year 1937, Britain had hoped to keep India divided by posing as champions of the Princes, the Muslims and the so-called ‘Depressed Classes’. In the General Election held under the new Constitution of 1935, they found, however, to their great surprise that all their tricks and bluffs had failed and that strong nationalist feeling permeated the whole nation and every section of it. Consequently, British policy has now fallen back on its last hope. If the Indian people cannot be divided, then the country – India – has to be split up, geographically and politically. This is the plan called ‘Pakistan’ which emanated from the fertile brain of a Britisher and which has precedents in other parts of the British Empire. For instance, Ceylon, which belongs geographically and culturally to India, was separated from India long ago. Immediately after the last war, Ireland, which was always a unified state, was divided into Ulster and the Irish Free State. After the new constitution of 1935, Burma was separated from India. And if the present war had not intervened, Palestine would already have been divided into a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British corridor running between the two. Having themselves invented Pakistan- or the plan for dividing India – the British have been doing a colossal – but skillful – propaganda in support of it. Though the vast majority of the Indian Muslims want a free and independent India, though the President of the Indian National Congress today is Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a Muslim, and though only a minority of the Indian Muslims support the idea of ‘Pakistan’, British propaganda throughout the world gives the impression that the Indian Muslims are not behind the national struggle for liberty and want India to be divided up. The British themselves know that what they propagated is quite false, but they nevertheless hope that by repeating a falsehood again and again, they will be able to make the world believe it” p. 187, [2]. He concluded on the topic saying that, “ And having themselves invented to divide India, they have so elaborated this plan that if they could manage things in their own way, they would divide India not into two states – as originally proposed – but into five or six states and all of these states would necessarily lie under the heel of Britain ‘’ p. 188, [2].
Bose started an “Azad Muslim” radio station to counteract the activities of the Muslim League p. 333, [8], and even more, to reach out to the nationalist Indian Muslims. Girija K. Mookerjee, an anti-Nazi Indian journalist p. 78, [7] who had worked under Bose in Germany in the period 1941-43, has written about the raison d’ etre for founding this radio station: “At about the same time [August 1942], we started also the Waziristan or the Azad Muslim Radio, at the suggestion of Subhas who began to be very worried about the attitude of the Muslim League. It was not meant so much to counteract Jinnah’s pro-British policy, which stood condemned by itself but what caused us anxiety was that many nationalist Muslims were also keeping aloof from the great movement of liberation which had been started by Congress. In Azad Muslim Radio, we put forward the point of view of nationalist Muslims and tried to show how the future of Indian Muslims was bound up with the future of India. A young Muslim from Hyderabad called Sultan who wrote and spoke excellent Urdu, took charge of it and in course of time, made quite a success of it…. Azad Muslim broadcast every day for fifteen minutes in Urdu dealing mostly with topics in which Muslims generally were interested ‘’ pp. 211-212, [4].
Did Bose really believe that Muslim separatism is entirely a British ploy and most of the Indian Muslims were Indian nationalists? Unlikely, because he was definitely aware of the external loyalties of the Indian Muslims. He has written in “Indian Struggle’’: “ Some months earlier (to December, 1921), Afghanistan had entered into a treaty with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and this was followed by a treaty between Persia and Soviet Russia. In Egypt, the Nationalist Wafd Party of Syed Zaghlul Pasha was strong and active. Thus it was apparent that the entire Moslem world was combining against Great Britain and this had an inevitable reaction on the Moslems of India’ p. 73, [1]. The external loyalties ran contrary to the principle of nationalism which was the guiding principle for Bose. The manner in which he marginalized individuals like Shedai who saw India as part of the Middle East and the Muslim world indicates that he was cognizant of the threat such external loyalties posed. He may not have read Islamic theology, very few Hindus of his time did. So he was in all likelihood unaware of any links between the Islamic theology and Muslim separatism. But quite apart from his beliefs and his knowledge, there was no other public position he could have assumed given his goal was to liberate India from the British rule and to retain a united India. Given how powerful the British was, it would have been suicidal to start multiple fronts, one of those being with the large Muslim populace in undivided India. It is also true that Britain was exacerbating and promoting Muslim separatism, they were utilizing the respective proclivities though they may not have created those entirely. This is because Britain wanted to create a battle that would be impossible for the Indian nationalists to win by provoking them to fight on an external and another internal front. Bose rightly did not want to play the game that Britain wanted Indian nationalists to, and followed the only course of action available to anyone including those with full knowledge of the mindsets, ideologies and complexities involved – sidestep the problem of Muslim separatism at that point. This course of action becomes even more compelling considering that he was then functioning from a foreign country which had its own interests, some of which were linked to Muslim support in the Arab world and Afghanistan.
While in Germany, Bose had not spoken on organizations in India that represented or claimed to represent the Hindu community beyond what has been quoted in this Section. It therefore becomes clear that he did not see much threat in Hindu fundamentalism, to the extent that it existed, much less equating it to Muslim fundamentalism.
Section C: Bose’s positions on non-Indian Muslims in Nazi Germany
In international context, Bose’s stance on non-Indian Muslims was driven by his goal of weakening the British Imperialism. On 29 April, 1941, Bose met Ribbentrop at the Hotel Imperial in Vienna p. 283, [8]. In this first meeting, he suggested to Ribbentrop that Germany declare independence for India and Arab nations p. 45, [7]. On 3 May, 1941, he submitted the following in a supplemental memorandum to the German Government, where he reiterated the same demand and advocated that the Axis powers start fomenting rebellion in these countries. He also argued that Germany needs to declare its support for the freedom of India and the Arab countries, before the start of any conflict with Russia or Turkey, otherwise it stands the risk of losing support in the Orient:
“The recent victories in North Africa, Yugoslavia and Greece have created a profound impression in all Oriental countries, particularly in India, and in the countries of the Near East like Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. British prestige in all these countries has been shattered and it is well known that Great Britain has up till now dominated Oriental countries largely because of her prestige as a world power. Simultaneously with Britain’s loss of prestige, several Oriental countries have begun to assert themselves in opposition to Great Britain.
I. This opposition has been openly manifested in Iraq.
II. From India are coming daily reports of unrest in several important centres.
III. In Egypt, after a long silence, the Wafd Party has raised its voice demanding that the Egyptian people should not participate in Britain’s war against Germany.
IV. In other Arab countries like Palestine, there is a strong undercurrent of unrest against Britain.
At this psychological moment, the Axis powers can capture the imagination of the entire Orient by an open declaration of policy with regard to the Orient and, in particular, with regard to India and the Arab countries. The latter countries hate Britain because she is an Imperialist power and they can be drawn into the Axis orbit if they are convinced that the Axis Powers will champion their emancipation from the British yoke. Even in those countries where there was a large measure of pro-Soviet feeling before the beginning of the present war (as in India), it is now realised that it is the Axis Powers alone (and not the Soviet) that can render practical help to them in their struggle for emancipation from British domination.
I therefore request
I. that an early pronouncement be made regarding the freedom of India and of the Arab countries.
II. that the work of organising revolts against Great Britain in these countries be commenced as soon as possible, so that the present favourable atmosphere in these countries may be properly utilised.
III. that the Axis Powers do now concentrate on attacking the heart of the British Empire, that is, British rule in India.
IV. that in order to facilitate the attack on British rule in India, steps be taken to upset the present pro-British Government in Afghanistan.
V. that steps, be taken to render military aid to Iraq against Great Britain, should that become necessary in future.
If this proposal is accepted and the work suggested is undertaken by the Axis Powers, then Germany will have the following advantages:
- There will be a long chain of friendly pro-German countries beginning from North Africa on the one side and right up to Japan in the Far East.
(B) If a conflict between Germany on the one hand and Soviet Russia or Turkey on the other, proves to be unavoidable in future, then Germany will have the sympathy of all the Oriental countries.
But if in the meantime a conflict with Turkey or the Soviet breaks out before the above proposal is given effect to, then Germany will probably lose the sympathy of the Oriental countries which she has gained because of her fight against British Imperialism.
For the success of the task of exterminating British power and influence from the countries of the Near and Middle East, it is desirable that the status quo between Germany and Soviet Russia should be maintained.
In order to strike at British Power in India, it is necessary to have some channel of communication between Germany on the one side and Afghanistan and India on the other. There are four alternative routes which appear possible and it is for the experts (military and political) to decide which routes they would prefer as being the most practicable:
Route I. Germany, Russia, Afghanistan, India
Route II. Balkans, Turkey (Syria?) Iraq, Persian Gulf and India
Route III. Balkans, Turkey, (Syria and Iraq?), Iran, Afghanistan and India
Route IV. Libya, Egypt, Suez Canal and India.
From the point of view of convenience, Route I appears to be the most desirable.
In any case, the indirect help of Soviet Russia or of Turkey is necessary for opening up a channel of communication between Germany on the one side and Afghanistan and India on the other.
When a channel of communication is once made, it will become easy for Germany to strike at British power and influence in Afghanistan and India. Then will come the end of the British Empire ‘’ pp. 50-52, [2].
Note that his advocacy for German positions in the Arab world and Afghanistan were never in isolation of the interests of India.
In addition, Bose had admired Muslims who had adopted modern values like Kemal Ataturk and the deposed king Amanullah of Afghanistan, as opposed to those vested in fundamentalist and theocratic principles. He supported the political objectives of the first set and had developed close connections with those of this category who then lived in Germany.
Mihir Bose has written about Bose’s support for Amanullah while in Germany: “ The Germans had, in fact, been active in Afghanistan since the end of the First World War. With Soviet help, they had tried to restore the deposed King Amanullah, a progressive monarch influenced both by the Russian Revolution and Kemal Ataturk’s rise in Turkey. Amanullah wanted co-education, a secular state with rights for women, free elections, Turkish-style changes in dress and development of industry. But his plans were resisted by the clergy and he also incurred the wrath of the British. He had not only inflicted a defeat on them in 1919, securing the country’s borders with British India, but his progressive ideas had worried the Raj’s political agents who feared that the tribals on their side of the border, still living in a largely medieval Islamic world, may take to such Western ideas. In 1928-29, a British-sponsored tribal revolt finally forced him to abdicate and he went into exile in Italy in the 1930s, dying there in 1960. Bose was keen to help Amanullah help regain his throne and told the Germans he would be welcomed back by 90 percent of the Afghans’’ pp. 279-280, [8]. One of Amanullah’s strong supporters and a former Afghan Foreign Minister, Ghulam Siddiq Khan, lived in Germany while Bose was there. Mihir Bose writes about his relation with Bose: “ Ghulam Siddiq Khan had lived in Germany since 1930 and was a strong supporter of ex-king Amanullah. He used to visit Bose’s home. Bose frequently urged the Germans to break off relations with the Afghan government and set up a government-in-exile in Berlin headed by Ghulam Siddiq’’ p. 297, [8]. Several other Muslims were regular visitors at his home in Berlin as well. We learn from Vyas: “Members of the Sonderrerferat Indien, like Dr. von Trott, and Dr. Werth, Asian leaders like the Grand Mufti, Rashid Ali, and Gulam Ali Siddiqi, often joined restful evening chats at Bose’s residence in Berlin.’’ p. 314, [3]. Hayes echoed the same: “ [Bose’s villa in Berlin] quickly became a gathering point for Indian, Arab, and Afghan communities in Berlin. Among them, they included the ousted Prime Minister of Iraq, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, the exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, and the former Afghan Foreign Minister, Ghulam Siddiq Khan ‘’ p. 67, [7]. For example, the Grand Mufti, Rashid Ali-el-Ghailani, Ghulam Ali Siddiqi were the invitees of the Independence Day, 26 January, 1943 celebration in Berlin among over thousand guests, which also included representatives of the German Government, Military High Command, Italian and Japanese embassies, and several other European and Asian countries p. 425, [3]. He had also appeared in public at a meeting of the Islamische Gesellschaft of Berlin at which he spoke together with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Rashid Ali Gailani of Iraq p. 215, [4].
References
[1] Subhas Chandra Bose, “The Indian Struggle’’, Netaji Collected Works, Volume 2, Edited by Sisir K. Bose and Sugata Bose
[2] Subhas Chandra Bose, “Azad Hind, Writings and Speeches, 1941-May 1943’’, Netaji Collected Works, Volume 11, Edited by Sisir K. Bose and Sugata Bose
[3] M. R. Vyas, “Passage Through a Turbulent Era’’
[4] Girija K. Mookerjee, “Europe at War (1938-1946) – Impressions of War, Netaji and Europe’’
[5] Leonard Gordon, “Brothers against the Raj’’
[6] Jan Kuhlmann, “Netaji in Europe’’
[7] Romaine Hayes, “Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany’’
SringeriBelur - Articles by Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh and Dikgaj 